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*Studies in the Veda.*¹—By FRANKLIN EDGERTON, Assistant Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

4. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6. 2.

The first part of this section, whose interpretation is not open to serious question, may be translated as follows:

‘The existent only, my dear, was this universe in the beginning—quite alone and without a second. Now some say: the non-existent only was this universe in the beginning, quite alone and without a second, and from this non-existent the existent was born.

‘But how, in sooth, my dear, could this be? said he, How could the existent be born from the non-existent? No; the existent only, my dear, was this universe in the beginning, quite alone and without a second.

‘It desired: May I become many, may I be propagated. It produced heat (*tejas*). This heat desired: May I become many, may I be propagated. It created waters . . .’

Then comes a sentence which I interpret thus, differing from all previous interpretations: ‘Therefore wherever it is hot, there a man swets, on account of the heat; as a result thereof (i. e. of the heat) waters are produced’.

After this the section closes with another statement whose interpretation is likewise clear enuf in general:

‘These waters desired: May we become many, may we be propagated. They produced (solid) food. Therefore wherever it rains, just there is the most food, on account of the waters; as a result thereof (i. e. of the waters) edible food is produced’.

The point of my new interpretation of the sentence about the production of waters from heat is the perfect parallelism

¹ The first three studies in this series were published in the *American Journal of Philology*, XXXV, 435ff., under the following titles: 1. The instrumental with verbs of ruling, AV. 4. 27. 4, 5.—2. AV. 4. 5. 7 = RVKh. 7. 55. 1.—3. *Apaskambhā*, AV. 4. 6. 4.

in external form between it and the following one about the production of food from waters. This parallelism has never been noticed by any commentator, and as a result all have totally failed to get the point. It seems to me, however, so obvious that it only needs to be pointed out to be recognized. To make it clear I think I shall only need to quote the Sanskrit of the two sentences, side by side. For convenience I divide them into separate clauses or phrases, lettered a, b, c and d.

- (a) { 1. *tasmâd yatra kva ca çocati* —
2. *tasmâd yatra kva ca varṣati* —
- (b) { 1. *svedate vâ puruṣas* —
2. *tad eva bhûyisṭham annam bhavaty* —
- (c) { 1. *tejasa eva* —
2. *adbhya eva* —
- (d) { 1. *tad-adhy âpo jâyante.*
2. *tad-adhy annâdyaṃ jâyate.*

Observe how perfectly the parallelism works out. Wherever so and so happens (a), then such and such a result is observed (b)—precisely on account of so and so (c, resuming a), for as a result thereof (*tad-adhi*) such and such is produced (d, resuming b). Again I say, I do not see how it is possible to question the parallelism, once it is pointed out. What has thrown the commentators off is the word *vâ*, in the phrase *svedate vâ puruṣas*. This word ordinarily means 'or', and is so taken here by all interpreters, thus making 'b' a correlative statement to 'a', and throwing out the parallelism completely. But *vâ* obviously cannot mean 'or' in this sentence. It would be comparatively simple to emend it to *vâi*, or to *eva* (*svedata eva* becoming corrupted to *svedate vâ*), either of which would make perfect sense; and it may be said in favor of the latter suggestion (the reading *svedata eva*) that it would make a more perfect parallel with 'b' of the parallel sentence, which is likewise connected with the preceding by *eva* (*tad eva bhûyisṭham* &c.). But no emendation is necessary. The particle *vâ* may be used precisely in the sense of *eva*: see the Petersburg lexicon s. v., meaning 4, and the places there quoted. At any rate, whether the reading *vâ* be kept or not, it seems to me there can be no doubt whatever of the meaning of the particle which originally stood here: it was simply a particle of emphasis, and did not mean 'or'.

The interpretations of Max Müller, Boehtlingk and Deussen, all of whom were misled by the word *vâ*, ar as follows. Müller: 'And therefore whenever anybody anywhere is hot *and perspires*, water is produced on him from fire alone'. Boehtlingk: 'Deshalb entsteht, so oft ein Mensch Kummer hat oder schwitzt, aus der Glut Wasser'. Deussen: 'Darum wenn ein Mensch die Glut des Schmerzes fühlt oder schwitzt, so entsteht aus der Glut das Wasser (der Thränen, des Schweisses)'. It will be noted that both Boehtlingk and Deussen absolutely ignore the important *tad-adhi*. Max Müller takes it as meaning 'on him', i. e. 'on the man'. All of them ignore the obvious parallelism with the following statement.

5. Chândogya Upaniṣad 6. 14.

This section contains the beautiful simile of the man brot to a strange land and left blindfolded to wander about aimlessly, until some one removes his eye-bandage and tells him in which direction to go; then he finds his way home. Just so a man in this world who has not received the true instruction in Upaniṣadic philosophy wanders about aimlessly, his mental eyesight dimmed by the eye-bandages of ignorance, until a teacher removes the bandage of ignorance and tells him in what direction to shape his life's course; then he will arrive at his true goal.

Tho the general sense of the passage has been correctly grasped by all interpreters, so far as I know, it seems to me that all their interpretations are open to objection in certain details.

I render the passage thus:

'As if, my dear, one should bring hither a man from the land of Gandhâra, with eyes bound tight, and should then turn him loose in a desert place; [as he would then drift about, eastward, or northward, or southward, having been brot hither blindfold; and having been turned loose blindfold];

'As if one should free him from the bandage (over his eyes), and should tell him: In this direction is the land of Gandhâra, go in this direction; he would ask (the way) from village to village, being a wise and intelligent man, and would actually arrive at the land of Gandhâra. Just so a man who has an instructor in this world knows. There is delay for

him only for so long a time as he is not freed (from the bonds of ignorance): then he will arrive (at his final goal)'.

Notes. (a) The sentence which I have enclosed in [square brackets] above, in my translation, reads in the Sanskrit thus: *yathā tatra prān vā, udān vā, adharān vā, pra dhmāyīta, abhinaddhākṣa ānītaḥ, abhinaddhākṣo viśṛṣṭaḥ*. No one seems ever to have explained why only three directions—east, north and south—are mentioned. Why not *west* too? Does it not mean that he would drift in *any and every* direction? So many readers must have thought, among them one Hindu copyist, who inserts *pratyān vā* 'or westward' after the words *adharān vā* 'or southward', to make it complete; and so likewise Boehtlingk, whose unimaginative rationalism is carried one step further, for he inserts *pratyān vā* between north and south, so as to have the four directions in perfect order—east, north, west, south. These insertions simply spoil the sense of the passage. If Boehtlingk and his Hindu predecessor had stopped to think where the land of Gandhāra is, they would never have made such a blunder. Gandhāra is the farthest *western* limit of Indian civilization, and if the blindfolded Gandhārese went westward, and kept it up long enough, he would arrive at his own home. That is not contemplated by the simile. There are of course three chances to one that he would go in some other direction; and it is this probability of error that the passage emphasizes when it says he would go 'eastward, or northward, or southward'.

(b) The verb *pra dhmāyīta* in this connexion certainly means 'be blown about (as by a wind)', 'drift'. Deussen comes closest to being right: he translates it 'verschlagen', that is 'start in the wrong direction'. Max Müller 'shout', so Hillebrandt *Ved. Chr.* 'laut ausrufen'; Boehtlingk 'sich aufmachen', apparently getting pretty close to the idea but not quite grasping it. The meaning seems to be made clear by the use of the active of the same verb *pra-dham* in AV. 18. 2. 28, *agnīṣ ṭān asmāt prā dhamāti yajñāt*, 'Agni shall blow them away (scatter them) from this sacrifice', and AV. 3. 2. 2 *prā vo dhamatu sarvātāḥ* 'Let him blow you forth (scatter you) in every direction'. Whether the form *pra dhmāyīta* be taken as middle (as Whitney Gr. 738b takes it) or as passive (as I should prefer to take it, with reference to the *y*; the ending *-īta* is no more irregular in one case than in the other), it evidently means

something like 'be blown forth, be made to drift helplessly'. Certainly Müller and Hillebrandt are wrong in taking it as a verb of shouting—all the more since the following words, which they regard as a direct quotation depending thereon, are provided with no *iti* or other sign of quotation.

(c) The last sentence of the passage translated is in the Sanskrit: *tasya tâvad eva ciraṃ, yâvan na vimokṣye, atha saṃpatsya iti*. 'Of him so long only is (or, will be) there delay (longness), as he shall not be releast (i. e., until he shall be releast); then he will arrive'. The verb *saṃ-pad* parallels *upa-saṃ-pad*, which is used above of the man from Gandhâra 'arriving' finally at Gandhâra. So here, the enlited man will 'arrive'—the destination being left to be supplied; it means, of course, he will 'arrive' at his true final goal in life, as taught by the Upaniṣadic philosophy. Max Müller translates: 'For him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be perfect'. This translation is not very far wrong; only it is from 'the bonds of ignorance', which keep him from seeing clearly, like the blindfolded man in the parable, that he is to be freed, rather than 'the body'; and 'be perfect' for *saṃ-pad* fails to bring out the idea of 'arriving', 'attaining', which as I said is clearly contained in the verb. The other translators are farther from the mark. Deussen, whose philological sense is usually so keen, makes the bad mistake of failing to see that *tasya*, the first word, refers back to *puruṣa* in the preceding sentence (*evam evahācāryavān puruṣo veda*). He makes the whole depend on the preceding *veda*, as a direct quotation of the man's thought, and renders: 'Diesem (Welttreiben) werde ich nur so lange angehören, bis ich erlöst sein werde, darauf werde ich heimgehen'. I do not see how *tasya* could mean 'diesem Welttreiben'; that would be at best *asya*, and rather harsh at that.

That the word *ciraṃ* may be a noun is shown by Pāṇini 6. 2. 6. It appears to mean 'delay', i. e. delay in getting started in the right direction (keeping still in mind the parable of the blindfolded man).

Deussen's 'erlöst werden' for *vimokṣye* (similarly also Boehtlingk) is a little too strong. It does not refer to final salvation, in the usual later sense; that is rather meant by *saṃ-patsye* in this sentence. Instead it refers, as I said, to being 'releast' from the blinding bandage of ignorance, so that one

can hav clear intellectual vision; only after this happens can one *start* in the direction of final salvation or 'attainment'. The parable of the blindfolded man is kept constantly in view, and the parallelism with it is scrupulously close. All translators hav faild to do justis to this circumstance.

6. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6. 16.

The parable containd in this section is that of the trial of a man accused of theft, by the ordeal of the heated ax.

'Also they lead along a man, my dear, with hands tied, saying: He has stolen, he has committed theft, heat the ax for him. If he is the doer of it, then indeed he makes himself false; covering himself with falsehood (*anṛtābhisamdhā*), enwrapping himself in falsehood (*anṛtenātmānam antardhāya*), he takes holds of the heated ax; he is burnt, then he perishes.

'Then if he is not the doer of it, then indeed he makes himself true; covering himself with truth (*satyābhisamdhā*), enwrapping himself in truth (*satyenātmānam antardhāya*), he takes hold of the ax; he is not burnt, then he is releast.'

It seems to me that the term *abhisamdhā*, used as the final member of the compounds *anṛtābhisamdhā* and *satyābhisamdhā*, must mean 'covering', 'that with which one covers'. The frase is thus a synonym for the following *anṛtenā-(satyenā-)-tmānam antardhāya*. This expressing of the same idea in juxtaposed doublets is one of the most familiar stylistic tricks of the Upaniṣads; it occurs, for instance, in this same section, in the first sentence: *apāhârṣît, steyam akârṣît*—'he has stolen, has committed theft'.

The word is generally taken as meaning 'speech, declaration' or the like: Deussen, 'Unwahres aussagend'; Boehtlingk, 'indem er eine unwahre Aussage macht'. Max Müller says, a little differently: 'the false-minded'. But the picture is of a *covering* by which the man seeks to protect himself from damage by the heated ax. If the covering he uses is falsehood, it is useless; he is burnt. If it is truth, then it protects him from the burning ax. The verb *abhi-dhâ* regularly has this meaning, and the derivativ of *abhi-sam-dhâ* is here used in the same sense. According to the most usual meaning of *abhi-sam-dhâ*, the word ought to mean 'purpose, intent'; but this is a long way from 'pronouncement, declaration', the meaning

assumed by Deussen and Boehtlingk, and not too close to Müller's 'mind'; and while wickedness of intention might have been predicated of the *prospectiv* thief, it is much less natural of the man who is about to submit to the ordeal.

It is interesting to observe that in the Râmâyana (5. 51. 21 Gorresio) practically the same compound occurs which is found in our Upaniṣad passage, viz. *satyâbhidhâna*, 'encased in righteousness'. Very significantly, as it seems to me, it is here also used with reference to virtue as a protection from the heat of fire; namely, it is applied to Sîtâ, who, it is alleged, will be safe from the devouring flames started by Hanumat to destroy Râvaṇa's city, because of her spotless virtue—because she is 'enwrapt in righteousness'.—There are two other occurrences in the Râmâyana (1. 6. 5 and 5. 30. 7, Gorresio) of the compound *satyâbhisandha*—this time the very same form as that found in the Chândogya Upaniṣad; but in both cases the word is a mere colorless epithet of King Daśaratha, and the context furnishes no evidence as to the real meaning.